¶ … American Journal of International Law (2009). President issues an executive order banning torture and CIA prisons. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 103, No. 2. Pp 331-334.
The article mentions that in line with President Obama's order to put an end to Guantanamo Bay detentions, there was an issue of executive orders. As empowered by the constitution, the orders reversed practices and policies from the Bush administration and the relationships with detention and interrogation of the terror suspects. The authors add that the order revoked Executive Order 13,440 that limited Common Article 3 application on Geneva Conventions. The order banned torture and humiliation and degrading treatment for persons under U.S. custody, control of detained persons from in armed conflicts, and limit U.S. interrogation techniques from the ones authorized through the Army Field Manual. Further, the order directed Central Intelligence Agency to end all detention facilities under its operations while barring future operations from the CIA facilities. The approach required prompt notification in line with International Committee of the Red Cross to persons within the United States holding armed conflicts and facilitate ICRC access to the individuals. The focus did not prohibit non-judicial renditions among prisoners. The authors mention that Section 5 created cabinet-level task forces that were chaired by the Attorney General to evaluate practices of renditions as well as whether subsequent interrogation techniques and practices could be an authorized approach to the intelligence agencies.
The article concludes that interrogation techniques and related treatment are issues of concern in the U.S. Individuals within custody and under effective control of officers, employees and other agents from the United States Government and those detained in facilities owned, controlled, or operated by departments or agencies of United States were to be treated in the possible humane limimts. Interrogation techniques, treatments, and approaches described in the Manual should be implemented according to the processes, conditions, limitations, and principles of Manual prescription. Nothing in order was to be construed as an agent of diminishing the rights that individuals have within the law and international treaties.
Canes-Wrone, B. (2001). President's Legislative Influence from Public Appeals. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 2. pp. 313-329.
The article observes that irrespective of the long-standing perception of modern plebiscitary powers for American presidents, no evidence shows that the public appeals have a systematic facilitation of influence. The article indicates that they are in a position of decreasing presidential bargaining control and power. The article resolves the disparity through the development of theoretical perspective for plebiscitary appeals as well as testing the approach on data within national audience. The article addresses the flexibility of Presidents Eisenhower through to Clinton's regime. Perspectives of the author suggest that the appeals of power can generate influence even as the influence is dependent on the presidential and strategic choice of issues in promoting trust among the public. Presidents are seen to promote policy issues that their positions are popular and that Congress could not alternatively enact the preferred policies.
Testing the perspective involves an analysis of simultaneous equations models under policy causes and consequences of the presidential appeals in terms of budgetary policy. The article regards development of the American presidency as a motivation of issues upon which presidential influence within the appellate sections of the public varies over time. The author establishes that all presidential attempts of mobilizing public opinion are drawn from the nineteenth century. The communications mediums and political institutions prevented presidents from attaining systematic successes based on the plebiscitary activities. The article adds that modern presidents and their systematic influence among public appeals permits the examination of future work within a degree that the influence becomes limited to forty years.
The change of public salience influences the behavior of legislators. Further, members are identified to be responsive to the constituency preferences regarding salient policies. The studies also suggest that presidents should be in a position of generating influence based on public appeals. The president's position should achieve policy goals through strategic publicity of issues that are taken to be responsive to policy positions for voters.
Kelley, C.S., Marshall, B., (2009). Assessing Presidential Power Signing Statements and Veto Threats as Coordinated Strategies. American Politics Research. Volume 37 Number 3. Pp 508-533.
The article observes that presidents have broad pools of strategies used in influencing legislation. The author dwells on issues that are perceived to have minimal emphasis on literature and executive's unilateral capability of issuing and signing statements as well as roles in developing policy. The article develops spatial models that illustrate how presidential bargaining power within Congress is expandable while veto threats are coordinated based...
The approach suggests that statements signatures are underappreciated and have a potential of causing valuable presidential influence in veto bargaining processes. The concept shows that the veto threats remain critical factors in explaining the constitutional signing statements used by the president. The author infers that the veto threats, as well as signed statements, link together to a broader coordinated strategy for presidential power within a legislative realm.
The ideology includes a focus on presidential use of veto and policy preferences viewed through extreme public influence. This approval rating could drop within a short time. Since presidents refrain from bearing the veto "public costs," they could be inclined towards making excessive concessions along Congress. Further, coordination and commitment models should be used in extending veto processes to involve veto threats. The models illustrate how such threats are added to the bargaining powers of presidents. Veto threats provide useful information for purposes of preventing confrontations. However, veto threats are imposed on considerable costs and constraints where presidents lack a following of major commitments.
In conclusion, the model in the article shows that all veto threats remain critical variables in the explanation of presidential decisions and issuing of constitutional signing statements. The existence of veto threats on bills substantively and significantly diversifies the possibilities of presidents issuing constitutional signature on statements. Formal models as well as supportive evidence facilitate presidential and formidable bargaining powers derived from veto threats and the enhancement of signing statements.
Palanza, V., & Sin, G., (2014). Veto Bargaining and the Legislative Process in Multiparty Presidential Systems. Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 47(5) 766 -- 792.
This article offers an analysis of usage of vetoes within multiparty presidential systems. The authors suggest that the scope of the main executive-legislative approach has a fundamental alteration when more parties are included in the legislature. Similar outcomes are observed when the presidential veto prerogatives extend to incorporate partial vetoes. The article used data sets that include bills passed through Argentine Congress from the last two decades estimating veto occurrence within specific scenarios. The findings illustrate an opposition of received expectations while the President holds influence over majority Congress members. The approach fails to explain the variations and likelihood of such vetoes.
The scope of the significance in terms of legislation relates to the prediction of vetoes through landmark legislations with a higher likelihood of veto success. The consideration surpasses the levels of support awarded to presidents in Congress. Additionally, partial vetoes are preferred alternatives in confronting legislation that the president initiated by himself. Common elements in different variants are that the vetoes have crucial bargaining elements for the power systems separation and influence over complex relationships between Congress and the President. Even though the vetoes comprise events, there is a mere possibility that requires legislators to take on presidential preferences early for purposes of negotiating legislation. Vetoes provide more insight to bargaining while permitting the legislative process.
The article offers an analysis of dynamics that underlie occurrences of the vetoes from multiparty powers systems separation. The concept does so through data sets constructed for the same purpose and includes bills passed by the Congress. The identification of vetoes that are imposed on such legislation boosts the ability of identifying the conditions that warrant such vetoes. The article calls to question all expectations that regard veto bargaining stemming from the analysis of bipartisan settings.
Beckmann, M.N., McGann, A.J., (2008). Navigating The Legislative Divide Polarization, Presidents, And Policymaking In The United States. Journal of Theoretical Politics 20(2): 201 -- 220.
The article illustrates that Washington's contemporary political landscape was based on polarization hallmarks. Although various literatures identify factors to propel the schism, the elements of theoretical work improved on investigations and consequential influence of the scheme. The building blocks of simple bargaining models are that exogenous actors like presidents have a strategic allocation of scarce political capital while inducing changes in preferences of legislators. The focus also examines how the varying elements in the chamber's preference distribution influence policy outcomes. Besides miring presidents' gridlock in preferred policies, the overall model illustrates how the ideological polarization forms the bimodal distribution and actual enabler of passage of policies in his ideals. This is contradictory to the greater ideological homogeneity.
The authors showed how the lack of presidential concern influenced ideological polarization and made collective voting necessary in changing the status quo. The alternative approach holds true as presidents may lack political capital. However, even with endowment with capital, there is a risk…
